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argument as a source of rigour in the practice based PhD 
 
Sally McLaughlin, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia 
Abstract 
This paper distinguishes between three views of argument: “argument as 
structure,” “argument as confrontation” and “argument as dialogical 
encounter.” Empirical studies of the criteria that examiners bring to the 
assessment of PhDs are cited. The studies provide evidence that qualities that 
align one or other of the three modes of argument figure significantly in the 
criteria that examiners bring to the assessment process. Embedded in the 
studies are respondents’ comments that suggest that the range of 
conceptions of argument held by PhD examiners is broad. Explicit use of the 
term “argument” is often made in reference to a minimal concept of 
argument – “argument as structure.” However, the reported comments 
indicate a significant bias towards qualities associated with concepts of 
argument that lie somewhere along the spectrum between “argument as 
confrontation” and “argument as dialogical encounter” as a marker of quality 
in PhD research. Drawing on the work of Hans Georg Gadamer the paper will 
explore the possibilities opened up by adopting the view of “argument as 
dialogical encounter” in the context of the PhD. In particular I consider the 
issue of how PhD projects be structured so as to support the construction of 
arguments appropriate to practice based research in design? 
Keywords  
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Practice based research is an emerging form of research both within design 
(Gray & Malins, 2004; Downton 2003) and within practice oriented disciplines 
more generally (Winter, Griffiths, & Green, 2000). Rigour remains a central 
concern for the practice based researcher (Biggs & Büchler, 2007).  
One approach to addressing issues of rigour is to adapt models that exist in 
more traditional research practices (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, Biggs 2007). 
In this paper I will concentrate on the issue of rigour as it applies in the context 
of PhD research and is manifest in the PhD thesis. The focus of the paper will 
be an exploration of the claim that argument, in the form of dialogical 
encounter, a genuine encounter with alternative positions, is a potential 
source of rigour in PhD research.  
In the first section, I outline the theoretical background to this claim. Dialogical 
encounter is a central theme of the hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer 
(1989; 2006). Gadamer develops this theme as both a literal and metaphorical 
account of the resources that allow us to move beyond an existing 
understanding of a situation.  




In the second section, I explore the claim in relation to two empirical studies of 
PhD assessment practices. The studies focus on identifying criteria and 
practices that examiners brought to the task of examining PhD theses. The 
findings of the study are considered with a view to determining a) the extent 
to which the examiners considered argument to be a significant feature of the 
PhD; and b) whether the examiners made distinctions between the modes of 
argument that may be evident in a PhD. 
In the third section, I consider the merits of configuring the various conceptions 
of argument – “argument as structure,” “argument as confrontation” and 
“argument as dialogical encounter” – as options along a continuum ranging 
from a focus on internal coherence at one end to a concern with broad 
reflexive, contextual engagement at the other. I explore the way in which the 
Gadamerian concepts of dialogical encounter (the exploration of multiple 
perspectives), the hermeneutic circle (the iterative development of 
understanding by moving between consideration of part and whole), and the 
recognition of human finitude (the recognition that understanding is an 
ongoing task, that we need to always leave ourselves open to the possibility 
of developing new perspectives, new insights about a situation) might 
influence the structure and development of PhD research. In particular I 
consider how these concepts might provide a coherent perspective from 
which to consider examiners’ comments relating to the use of literature, 
research design, the interaction between various components of the research, 
the analysis of findings and the outcome of the research.  
I conclude the paper with a discussion of the relevance of Gadamer’s 
concept of dialogical encounter to a debate taking place with regard to 
issues of rigour as they show up in the context of practice based research in 
art and design. 
Dialogical Encounter  
Richard Bernstein (1991, pp.337-338) draws a distinction between two modes 
of argument. The first may be described as a ‘confrontational’ or ‘adversarial’ 
mode of argument. In this mode the author ‘goes after’ positions that are at 
odds with his or her own position with the aim of exposing the weaknesses of 
those positions. The second mode of argument is characterised as a 
‘dialogical’ mode. Here the author seeks to engage in genuine dialog with 
alternative positions. The author’s aim in engaging in this mode of argument is 
to challenge his or her own understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation by seeking  “to strengthen the other’s argument as much as 
possible so as to render it plausible” (Gadamer as cited in Bernstein, 1991, 
p.338).  
Bernstein acknowledges that both modes of argument have their place. The 
‘confrontational’ mode can be useful in interrogating a position, it can help to 
identify the issues at stake, expose vague claims, and draw attention to 
difficulties that need to be addressed. However, in adopting this mode of 
argument the author runs the risk of being “blind to what the other is saying 
and to the truth that the other is contributing to the discussion” (Bernstein 1991, 
pp.337). The ‘dialogical’ mode of argument demands imaginative projections 
that move beyond the author’s existing position. Only by being open and 




responsive to the potential of alternative perspectives can one hope to be 
truly attentive to the possibilities and limitations of one’s own position. 
‘Dialogical encounter’ is a central theme arising from the ontological position 
explored by Hans Georg Gadamer (Gadamer 1989, 2006). Gadamer offers an 
alternative to the extremes of objectivism and relativism (Bernstein 1983). 
Gadamer’s ontogical position, his position on our relationship to the world, 
might be characterised as “perspectival realism” (Wachterhauser, 1994). 
Gadamer challenges the objectivist assumption that the way to true 
knowledge is to rid ourselves of our preconceptions and to view the 
phenomena under consideration from a completely neutral detached point 
of view – a view from nowhere. Building on Heidegger’s careful 
phenomenonogical descriptions of the prior understanding that we bring to 
everyday situations such as entering a lecture theatre (Heidegger, 1982), or 
using a hammer (Heidegger, 1962), Gadamer maintains that understanding is 
only made possible by the prior understanding that we bring to a situation. 
Prior understanding is formed primarily through being inducted into practices 
that shape the way in which we orient ourselves to the world. Practices range 
from the driving practices of residents in particular localities (Spinosa, Flores, & 
Dreyfus, 1997) and our child rearing practices (Dreyfus, 1991), to the practices 
operating within particular professions and the practices that shape our 
ethical judgements (Bernstein, 1986). Our practices shape the way in which 
we act in the world, and the way in which we perceive the world. Our 
practices operate at basic levels of perception governing what we notice, 
what shows up for us. Our practices give us a perspective from which to view 
a situation. It is recognition of the solidarity that arises from our being inducted 
into shared practices that frees us from the spectre of relativism (Bernstein, 
1983). 
If we accept that we can only ever have an understanding of a situation by 
coming to that situation from a particular perspective, then this raises the issue 
of how it is possible to move beyond that perspective. This is where 
Gadamer’s model of dialogical encounter comes into play. Gadamer 
develops detailed descriptions of the way in which our understanding is 
transformed through engaging in open dialog with an “other.” When we enter 
into a conversation each participant brings a particular perspective to the 
matter at hand. Through the course of the conversation similarities and 
differences emerge. If we are attentive to the differences, if we genuinely try 
to project into the situation to see how the other’s claims might make sense, 
then our own initial conception of the situation is inevitably changed. At the 
very least we have a broader conception of the way in which the situation at 
hand might be interpreted. At a more fundamental level, key aspects of our 
initial conception of the situation may no longer seem tenable. Gadamer 
employs the term “fusion of horizons” to describe the development of our 
initial perspective (horizon) that occurs through open dialog. Through dialog, 
the initial perspective may shift in ways that align more effectively with the 
perspective of the other, but this is always a development of an initial 
perspective. Our changed perspective will never be identical to the 
perspective of the other. The initial projection into the situation is always 
productive of any future understanding of the situation that we might attain. 




Gadamer develops the theme of “dialogical encounter” with a view to 
exploring both literal and metaphorical applications. Gadamer’s work arises 
out of the tradition of hermeneutics, a tradition concerned with the practice 
of interpreting texts. In the context of the hermeneutic tradition, the 
“dialogical partner” is the text. In the context of empirical research, the 
dialogical partner might initially be the site of research, and as the research 
progresses, the dialogical partner might become the research findings or data. 
Data can reveal it’s otherness by not appearing to fit with the expectations 
generated by our initial projection into a situation – an appropriate response 
would be to try to develop alternative perspectives on the situation that 
would allow us to make sense of the data.  In the context of practice, the 
practitioner projects into a situation through action. The dialogical partner 
might be aspects of the practice context in which the practitioner acts – for 
example, the medium which he or she employs, the problems or issues which 
he or she seeks to address, or the stakeholders impacted by his or her actions. 
The otherness of the situation might reveal itself through any or all of these 
aspects as the implications of the action emerge. 
From a Gadamerian perspective dialogical encounter is central to any 
concept of rigour in the human sciences. In this paper I report on a preliminary 
study where I adopt the theoretical perspective on argument opened up by 
Gadamer, with a view to understanding the extent to which Gadamer’s 
model of “argument as dialogical encounter” is manifest in existing PhD 
assessment practices. 
PhD assessment: a review of two empirical studies 
In this section I review the findings of two qualitative studies of the assessment 
practices of PhD examiners in Australia the UK. Both studies were based on 
examiners’ self reported understanding of the criteria and practices that they 
employed when examining a PhD. My review will focus on the following: Is 
there evidence that examiners consider argument to be a significant feature 
of the PhD? Do examiners make distinctions between the modes of argument 
that may be evident in a PhD? 
I have chosen to focus on these studies because they are based on insights 
into process of PhD assessment derived from examiners. These are insights that 
have evolved from practice. As such, it might be expected that they might be 
both more revealing and more inclusive than criteria vetted through 
institutional policy making processes (see for example the list of criteria 
published in Gray and Malins, 2004 pp.188-189).  
The first study (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000), based in the UK, was motivated 
by a desire to identify the basis on which to make judgements of worth with 
regard to practice based PhD theses. The approach of the researchers was a) 
to report on their own experiences as assessors and an author of practice 
based PhD theses in education; and b) to survey 91 examiners of traditional 
PhD’s from a range of disciplines (21 including the sciences, Music, English, 
Philosophy, Sociology, Information Technology, Art History, Women’s Studies, 
Law, Nursing and Education) with a view to identifying those qualities that 
would allow them to make a determination with regard to borderline theses. 
The responses to the survey are reported in full. The authors acknowledge that 
the study is preliminary and that their findings and conclusions are provisional. 




Reflecting on the outcomes of the survey, the authors claim that most of the 
criteria identified would apply equally to the practice based PhD thesis as 
they would to theses based on more traditional modes of research. 
The second, Australian based study (Mullins & Kiley, 2002), was designed to 
clarify the criteria and processes relevant to PhD assessment more generally. 
The focus of this study was the traditional PhD. The study was based on 30 semi 
structured interviews with experienced examiners, defined as having 
examined the equivalent of five PhD theses in the previous five years, across 
the domains of science (14), maths/engineering (3), social science (9) and 
humanities (4). This study was more comprehensive than the first in both design 
and analysis but the responses to the interviews are reported only in summary. 
I was not involved in either of the original studies and am relying entirely on 
published data. 
The analysis reported in this paper is framed by a specific theoretical interest – 
understanding the extent to which modes of argument akin to Gadamer’s 
model of “argument as dialogical encounter” are sought out in the context of 
PhD assessment. The first question under consideration was: Is there evidence 
that examiners consider argument to be a significant feature of the PhD? The 
data available was originally analysed for the explicit presence of the terms 
“argument” or “argues.” The first pass through the published data focussed on 
explicit use of these terms by respondents. The second pass explored use of 
these terms by the researchers involved in the original studies as manifest in 
their published reports.  
The third pass through the data involved identifying respondents’ comments 
that included terms that have an implicit relationship to the term argument. 
Three conceptual clusters of terms were identified corresponding to the three 
modes of argument: “argument as structure,” “argument as confrontation” 
and “argument as dialogical encounter.” A fourth cluster was developed to 
account for those comments that might relate to either a confrontational or 
dialogical mode. 
The second question considered was: Do examiners make distinctions 
between the modes of argument that may be evident in a PhD?An initial pass 
through the data was structured by Bernstein’s categories of “argument as 
confrontation” and “argument as dialogical encounter” however it quickly 
became apparent that these categories were not sufficient to cover the uses 
of the term argument evident in the published data. A third category 
“argument as structure” was introduced. The rationale for the introduction of 
this specific category will be discussed in the relevant section below. As in the 
previous section those comments explicitly including the terms “argument” 
and “argues” derived directly from the respondents were the first to be 
considered. This was followed by consideration of the context of use of the 
term argument by the original researchers. 
The third pass through the data involved identifying and classifying 
respondents’ comments that included terms that have an implicit relationship 
to the term argument – the conceptual clusters described above were 
employed. A fourth pass examined the original researchers’ use of these 
related terms. 




Both the Winter et al study and the Mullins and Kiley study reported responses 
from PhD examiners drawn from a wide variety of disciplines. There was 
insufficient information in the published data to categorise the responses in 
terms of the disciplinary background of the respondents. Further, there was 
insufficient data reported to identify the ontological/theoretical commitments 
of the respondents.  
Is there evidence that examiners consider argument to be a 
significant feature of the PhD? 
Argument is explicitly mentioned in only four of the eighty seven reported 
comments in the Winter, Griffiths, & Green study. Negative features included: 
“failure to follow up and evaluate alternative lines of argument” (Winter, 
Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.33); and “lack of focus, stated aim, ‘tightly managed’ 
structure or coherent argument” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.33). Positive 
features included: “presents a sense of the researcher’s learning as a journey, 
as a structured, incremental process of both argument and discovery” (Winter, 
Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.34); and “argues against conventional views, 
presents new frameworks for interpreting the world” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 
2000 p.35).  
Explicit use of the term in the reported comments by respondents in the study 
is similarly limited, however they do report a comment report a comment that 
indicates a direct correlation between research and argument – “Is this 
actually ‘research’ – is there an argument?” (Mullins and Kiley, 2002, p.377). 
In contrast to the limited use of the term by respondents, argument features 
prominently in Mullins and Kiley’s summary of the characteristics of a “positive” 
thesis. Mullins and Kiley (2002, p.379) identify five broad characteristics of 
positive theses: “scholarship” (“originality, coherence, and a sense of student 
autonomy or independence”), “the development of a well structured 
argument” (“argument, conceptualisation, conclusion, design, logic and 
structure”); “sufficient quantity as well a quality of work” (quality was linked to 
the concept of “publishability”); “reflection” (“critical assessment of their own 
work,” “critical of their own argument”); and the capacity to “work their way 
through problems” (“recognising and dealing with contradictions”). Not only is 
“the development of a well structured argument” one of the five key features 
of positive theses, but the category of “reflection” is elaborated by reference 
to criticality in relation to the author’s own argument. 
 “Argument” also featured in the list of seven characteristics used to identify a 
poor thesis. These characteristics were “lack of coherence”; “lack of 
understanding of the theory”; “lack of confidence”; “researching the wrong 
problem”; “mixed or confused theoretical and methodological perspectives”; 
“work that is not original”; and “not being able to explain at the end of the 
thesis what had actually been argued at the end of the thesis.”  
In their summary of what makes an outstanding PhD, Mullins and Kiley (2000, 
p.380) report that “examiners were looking for students who exhibited a sense 
of confidence in the way they dealt with the material and sophistication in the 
way they presented their argument.”  




Finally, Mullins and Kiley (2000, p.383) list “the structure of argument” as one of 
five indicators that examiners use to make “substantive judgements” with 
regard to the quality of the thesis. 
While explicit use of the term “argument” by respondents in both studies is 
limited, implicit references to argument abound. A difficulty arose in analysing 
these implicit references in that that discriminations as to what counts as an 
implicit reference to argument cannot be isolated from assumptions about 
what argument is, about what counts as argument. I will therefore defer 
analysis of the relative prominence of these implicit references to argument 
until after consideration of data relating to modes of argument. 
Do examiners make distinctions between the modes of argument 
that may be evident in a PhD?  
In the remainder of the paper I will draw a distinction between three modes of 
argument: “argument as structure,” “argument as confrontation” and 
“argument as dialogical encounter.” The categories “argument as 
confrontation” and “argument as dialogical encounter” are theoretical 
categories, derived from Bernstein as described earlier in this paper.  The 
category “argument as structure” was introduced in response to the data. 
Mullins and Kiley, for example, associate “the development of a well 
structured argument” with “logic and structure” (2000, p.379).The category is 
intended to capture the sense in which an argument might be conceived as 
a sequence of claims backed by evidence. The concept of “argument as 
structure” can be distinguished from the other modes of argument in that it is 
primarily concerned with internal coherence. The other modes of argument 
are defined in terms of the relationship to an external position – “an other.” 
The distinction between “argument as confrontation” and “argument as 
dialogical encounter” has already been discussed. 
The comments reported in the Winter, Griffiths, & Green indicate uses of the 
term “argument” that move between the three modes. The comment “lack of 
focus, stated aim, ‘tightly managed’ structure or coherent argument” (Winter, 
Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.33) suggests a view of argument as a structural 
feature of the thesis. The emphasis is on internal coherence, on ensuring that 
the argument responds to a stated aim. There is no indication that the 
appropriate response should extend beyond ensuring that claims follow on 
from one another, and from the data. There is no indication of an assumption 
that argument implies that alternative views need to be taken into account. 
The comment “argues against conventional views, presents new frameworks 
for interpreting the world” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.33) suggests a 
confrontational model. Here the “other” is conceived of in terms of 
“conventional views.” The researcher must present the merits of the new 
frameworks that he or she has developed by arguing against the alternatives. 
“Failure to follow up and evaluate alternative lines of argument” (Winter, 
Griffiths & Green, 2000 p.33) evokes a dialogical mode. The implication is that 
the researcher is bound to consider the merits of his or her own argument by 
considering the possibilities opened up by alternative positions. The comment, 
“presents a sense of the researcher’s learning as a journey, as a structured, 
incremental process of both argument and discovery” (Winter, Griffiths & 
Green, 2000 p.34), is difficult to classify. The reference to a structured 




incremental process suggests a view of argument as structure, however the 
quote taken as a whole, suggests a reflexive relationship between argument 
and discovery, which might be considered to be a form of dialogical 
encounter where the researcher opens themselves up to consideration of the 
alternative perspectives that present themselves as they work through the 
research process, the “process of argument and discovery.” 
In the Mullins and Kiley study, the researchers’ themselves appear to adopt a 
view that the term “argument” refers primarily to the structure of the thesis. 
Comments relating to “argument, conceptualisation, conclusion, design, logic 
and structure” are synthesised into the positive characteristic “the 
development of a well structured argument” (Mullins & Kiley, 2002, p.379).  In 
their summary of the characteristic of a poor thesis, the only comment 
referring directly to argument seems to be conceived of in similarly structural 
terms – “not being able to explain at the end of the thesis what had actually 
been argued at the end of the thesis” (Mullins & Kiley, 2002, p.379). The 
comment “Is this actually ‘research’ – is there an argument?” (Mullins & Kiley, 
2002, p.377) is difficult to classify but it is conceivable that it could refer to 
argument in the most minimal sense – as a sequence of inferential structures. 
It is important to note, however, that under the broad category of “reflection” 
Mullins and Kiley report a comment – “critical of their own argument” (Mullins 
& Kiley, 2002, p.379) – that indicates a desire to see evidence of a 
confrontational or dialogical mode of argument. Further, when they turn their 
attention to the qualities of an outstanding thesis, the 
confrontational/dialogical modes of argument come into play in the 
introduction of “a level of sophistication in the presentation of (an) argument” 
–  “The outstanding PhDs…are critical of previous work in the area or make 
critical assessment of their own work.” (Mullins & Kiley, 2000, p.380). 
Moving beyond those comments where the term “argument” has been used 
explicitly, there is substantial evidence in the Winter, Griffiths, & Green study 
that the range of conceptions of argument cover the full spectrum from 
argument as structure, to the confrontational/adversarial mode, and the 
dialogical mode. It is difficult to assess whether the Mullins and Kiley study 
uncovered a similar range of views as the outcomes are reported only in 
summary. Only limited use has been made of comments reported in that 
study in the analysis below. 
Comments oriented towards the conception of argument as a structural 
feature of the PhD include the negative features: “conclusions stated to early 
and not brought together,” “lack of clearly formulated conclusions,” “ill-
justified changes of direction,” “lack of initial focus/conviction” (Winter, 
Griffiths & Green, 2000, pp.32-33); and the positive features: “maintains clear 
and continuous links between theory, method and interpretation,” “connects 
theory and practice,” “displays coherence of structure (e.g. the conclusions 
follow clearly from the data),” “possesses a definite agenda and an explicit 
structure” “is comprehensive in its theoretical linkages or makes novel 
connections between areas of knowledge,” “Shows depth and breadth of 
scholarship – synthesising previous work and adding original 
insights/models/concepts” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, pp.34-35). Drawing 
on the Mullins and Kiley study, where the comments are reported only in 




summary, the only  relevant reported comment is: “Logical progression of 
ideas, work and presentation” (Mulins & Kiley p.379). 
Comments oriented toward the confrontational/adversarial view of argument 
include: on the negative side, “failure to defend properly the validity and 
generalisability of innovative research methods” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 
2000, p.33); and on the positive, “argues against conventional views, presents 
new frameworks for interpreting the world” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, 
p.35). 
Comments that indicate a view that lies somewhere along the spectrum 
between the confrontational and the dialogical view of argument include: on 
the negative side, “dogmatic presupposition of issues,” “apparent 
unawareness of the limitations of the work undertaken,” “uncritical use of 
references” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, pp.32-34); on the positive, “shows 
readiness to examine apparently tangential areas for possible relevance,” 
“shows iterative development, allowing exploration and rejection of 
alternatives,” “possesses an internal dialogue – plurality of approach/method, 
to validate the one chosen,” “a broad theoretical base treated critically,” 
“successfully critiques established positions,” “engages critically with other 
significant work in the field,” “draws on literature with a focus different from 
the viewpoint pursued in the thesis, “maintains a balance between 
delineating an area of debate and advocating a particular approach,” 
“goes beyond its sources to create a new position which critiques existing 
theoretical positions,” “Contains innovation, speculation, imaginative 
reconstruction, cognitive excitement: ‘the author has clearly wrestled with the 
method, trying to shape it to gain new insights” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, 
pp.33-35). Mullins and Kiley (2002, p.380) report two comments in the context 
of summarising their findings with regards to the qualities of an outstanding 
thesis. Both emphasise the opening up of new perspectives, articulating those 
perspectives with reference to previous work in the domain. The first is from an 
examiner with a science background: “The outstanding PhDs have beautifully 
conceived ideas that open up a new area or really answer an important 
question, and are critical of previous work in the area or make a critical 
assessment of their own work.” The second is from an examiner in the 
humanities: “you can see that the material is taken and used originally at 
every level – methodology, literature review, etc. Right from the beginning it 
makes you see an area that you thought you knew in a way that you hadn’t 
thought about before.”  
Comments more specifically oriented towards a dialogical view include: on 
the negative side, “failure to follow up and evaluate alternative lines of 
argument” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, p.33); and on the positive, “gives a 
systematic account of the topic, including a review of all plausible possible 
interpretations,” “skilfully organises a number of different angles (required by 
the extended length of the work)” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, p.34). 
The first point that should be made with regard to the analysis above is that 
“argument” is a complex term. Mullins and Kiley (2002, p379) refer to 
argument as if it were a straight forward concept, but analysis of the 
comments cited above indicates that the term “argument” is being used by 
the examiners to refer to a very different modes of argument – requiring a 
wide variety of supplementary terms to distinguish between those modes. 




Further, many forms of expression that do not make explicit reference to the 
term “argument” are used to describe qualities that align with one or other 
mode of argument. 
While the examiners’ comments suggest an inclusiveness that would in most 
instances recognise a dialogical mode of argument as a valuable quality 
within a PhD thesis, this very inclusiveness suggests that the notion of argument 
as an encounter with an external position is perhaps being overlooked, and 
that the potential of dialogical encounter as a source of rigour is not being 
adequately recognised. 
Revisiting the question “Is there evidence that examiners consider 
argument to be a significant feature of the PhD?” 
As has been noted earlier, the Mullins and Kiley data is reported mainly in 
summary so analysis of the relative importance of the implicit references to 
the various modes of argument reported in that study would not be 
meaningful. The analysis of implicit references in this section will be restricted 
to the Winter, Griffiths & Green study. 
Comments included in the conceptual cluster associated with “argument as 
structure” include terms that broadly corresponded to the following: “defined 
focus/aims,” “coherence/control of material/structure/organisation,”  
“justified/clearly formulated conclusions,” and “links between components of 
research eg. theory, method, interpretation; or theory and practice.” 
Comment included in the conceptual cluster associated with either 
“argument as confrontation” or “argument as dialogical encounter” include 
terms corresponding to “examination/interrogation of 
assumptions/prejudices/advantages and disadvantages of approaches,” 
and “critical engagement with literature/positions other than own.” A 
category of comments that might be considered to be loosely associated 
with this conceptual cluster were comments relating to “contextualisation” 
and “breadth of understanding of the topic or area.” It was decided not to 
include these comments as the link to criticality or argument was not evident. 
Comments specifically associated with the model of “argument as 
confrontation” included terms such as “defends against” or “argues against.” 
Comments specifically associated with the model of “argument as dialogical 
encounter” included terms such as “exploration of alternative 
approaches/angles/lines of inquiry.” 
Categorising the comments according to these conceptual clusters brought a 
number of aspects of the Winter, Griffiths, & Green (2000) study to light. First, 
terms associated the concept of “argument as structure” featured quite 
prominently in the “negative features” of a thesis. This corresponds to the 
findings reported in summary in the Mullins and Kiley report where a lack of 
these structural features was seen as significant failing in a thesis. Interestingly, 
a number of terms associated with the other modes of argument also showed 
up as being relevant to the list of “negative features.” This is somewhat at 
odds with the reported outcomes in the Mullins and Kiley study. 
Qualities associated with the concept of argument as structure were also 
present in the list of positive features of a PhD thesis. A significant number of 




the features listed as positive features of a PhD aligned with the “argument as 
confrontation” and/or the “argument as dialogical encounter” models. 
Discrimination between the two models could not be determined to the 
extent that any significant difference in the relative importance of the two 
models could be perceived. As in the Mullins and Kiley study it appears that 
the confrontational and dialogical models of argument assume greater 
importance as examiners move their attention away from consideration of the 
potential failings of a thesis (borderline cases) and towards those aspects of a 
thesis that mark it out a work of quality. 
Discussion 
Argument as Dialogical Encounter or Argument + Reflection 
The empirical studies reveal that the use of the term “argument” is very broad. 
Is there any value in insisting on the use of the term “argument” to cover the 
full range of activities that might be envisaged under the categories 
“argument as structure,” “argument as confrontation” and “argument as 
dialogical encounter?” Would it be better to expect that the term “argument” 
should imply only the display of minimal structural features (a clear relationship 
between research question, research approaches, findings and conclusions; a 
logical progression of ideas) and to supplement the criteria of “the 
development of a well structured argument” with additional features such as 
“critical review of previous work in area” and “defends against inevitable 
critiques” (argument as confrontation); or “critical review of all plausible 
interpretations relevant to topic” and “critical reflection on own argument” 
(argument as dialogical encounter)?  
The first point to make here is that the different modes of argument carry with 
them very different expectations about the form that the argument should 
take. “The development of a well structured argument” is not a feature that 
would remain unchanged across the different modes of argument. Second, it 
is unlikely that any thesis of quality would engage exclusively with any one 
mode of argument. While it might be appropriate to adopt a dialogical mode 
when exploring issues central to the topic of the thesis, a confrontational 
mode or even a structural mode might be appropriate when dealing with 
issues that are peripheral to the main site of investigation. Conceiving of the 
various modes of argument as options, the relative merits of which should be 
considered throughout the design of the PhD research, has the potential to 
provide a valuable perspective on the project design. Third, from a 
Gadamerian perspective, dialogical encounter, shows up as a fundamental 
resource in the pursuit rigour. Dialogical encounter is not a feature that can be 
added on to the argument proper, but an ethical position that has the 
potential to influence every stage of the thesis. Some of the ways in which the 
dialogical model of argument might play out in relation to specific aspects of 
the form of PhD research are discussed below. 
Some implications for the form of a PhD 
There are a number of points at which a Gadamerian engagement with a 
plurality of perspectives might come into play in the development of a PhD 




thesis. These parallel some of the detailed comments reported in the Winter, 
Griffiths & Green study. 
First, working from a model of dialogical encounter, it would be expected that 
the purpose of the background literature review should be seen as both the 
articulation of the boundaries of the study and identification of alternative 
lines of enquiry (traditions). This approach would seem consistent with the 
following: “grasps the scope and possibilities of the topic,” “gives a systematic 
account of the topic, including a review of all plausible possible 
interpretations” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, pp.33-34). 
Second, it might be expected that the methodology should include a range 
of approaches to the investigation of the topic. Triangulation is often cited as 
a source of rigour in the context of qualitative research. From a Gadamerian 
point of view, the value of triangulation might be seen to lie in the range of 
perspectives on the phenomena under consideration that the findings from 
multiple methods can offer. Relevant comments include: “shows diligence 
and rigour in procedures – catholic and multifactorial approaches to 
problems,” “possesses an internal dialog – plurality of approach/method, to 
validate the one chosen (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, pp.33-34). 
A number of comments in the Winter et al study recommend an iterative 
approach to the development of the research. This would be consistent with 
Gadamer’s concept of the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1989, p.265) where 
understanding emerges through an iterative process of moving between 
considerations of part and whole. From a Gadamerian point of view, all 
aspects of the study should be considered in relation to one another and 
should be reviewed as new perspectives emerge. Relevant comments include: 
“presents a reflexive, self-critical account of relationships involved in the 
inquiry and of the methodology,” “shows readiness to examine apparently 
tangential areas for possible relevance,” “shows iterative development, 
allowing exploration and rejection of alternatives” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 
2000, pp.33-34). The comment “maintains clear and continuous links between 
theory, method and interpretation” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, p.34) 
might also be relevant as it seems to imply that theory and method might be 
impacted by interpretation and thus open to new considerations and revision. 
The consideration of multiple perspectives might also be expected to apply to 
the interpretation of findings and to consideration of the implications of 
findings. Relevant comments from the examiners include: “skilfully organises a 
number of different angles,” “draws on literature with a focus different from 
the viewpoint pursued in the thesis” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000, p.34). 
Finally, it is a central tenant of Gadamer’s position that understanding is 
always provisional, that we must always be open to the possibility, that new 
perspectives may be developed that will supplant those that are currently 
available. If a researcher were to hold fast to the model of dialogical 
encounter then it might be expected that the position or positions arrived at 
through the thesis research would not be conclusive, that the most significant 
contribution of the thesis might be in a more refined articulation of the topic.  
Relevant comments include: “indicates the future development of the work,” 
“opens up neglected areas or takes a new viewpoint on an old problem,” 




“presents new frameworks for interpreting the world” (Winter, Griffiths & Green, 
2000, pp.34-35). 
Some implications for the form of the practice based PhD in 
design 
Biggs & Büchler (2007) provide a useful perspective on the state of play with 
regard to discussions of the issue of rigour within the context of practice based 
research in art and design. I agree with Biggs & Büchler that practice based 
research “should not be set apart from traditional academic concepts” and 
that “elements of academic research need to be reframed in such a way as 
to account for the specificities of design practice, without losing their original 
purpose” (Biggs & Büchler, 2007, pp.64-65). Biggs & Büchler characterise rigour 
as a property of process, suggesting that it entails “systematic and thorough 
search” (2007, p.66). This elaboration of the term “rigour” is linked to an extract 
from an OED definition of research: “the act of searching (closely and 
carefully) for or after a specified thing…” (Biggs & Büchler, 2007, p.65). Biggs 
and Büchler make reference to this systematic and thorough search playing 
out in the context of literature search, methodology and “the chain of 
reasoning” that establishes a logical connection between the methods and 
the outcomes of the research (Biggs & Büchler, 2007, pp.68-69).  
I would argue that the model of “argument as dialogical encounter” reveals 
the possibility of bringing an ethical dimension to the concept of rigour. 
Depending on the project, engagement with the perspectives of the other 
might include engagement with the perspectives of other researchers in the 
field; with other practitioners in the field; with users, clients; and with 
perspectives that represent the interests of those impacted by the 
environmental, economic, social and cultural implications of the project more 
generally. The emphasis shifts from a concern with being systematic, towards 
an aspiration to be empathetic, to really hear what the other is saying, to try 
to make as much sense as is possible of what the other is saying, and to allow 
the perspectives that we bring to our initial understanding of a situation to be 
opened up through consideration of the perspective of an other.    
The Biggs & Büchler paper is in large part a response to an earlier paper by 
Wood (2000). Wood suggests that the practice based researcher should move 
away from the concept of rigour as it has traditionally played out in the 
context of the PhD because it is bound to a confrontational/adversarial mode 
of argument that does not adequately recognise the need to support 
students in (i) recognising their own insights; (ii) identifying with other facts, 
arguments and views; (iii) clarifying their own position and (iv) evaluating their 
own knowledge (Wood 2000, p. 46). It is difficult to understand Wood’s claim 
with regard to point (iii) as clarification of one’s own position would seem to 
be the principle merit of engaging in the confrontational/adversarial mode 
(Bernstein, 1991 pp.337).  However, points (i) (ii) and (iv) do highlight the 
potential shortcomings of the confrontational/adversarial mode of argument. 
But is the PhD necessarily tied to the confrontational/adversarial mode of 
argument? I would also take issue, as have Biggs and Büchler, with Wood’s 
very narrow characterisation of rigour as “logical accuracy and exactitude” 
(Wood 2000, p.46). It should be acknowledged, however, that even if the 
concept of rigour is interpreted more broadly, as in Biggs & Büchler’s 




“systematic and thorough search” (2007, p.66), the concept does seem to 
omit, and possibly even be at odds with some of the potential qualities of 
practice based research that Wood is interested in promoting:  situated 
judgement, deep reflection, heuristic thinking, insight and innovation.  
Rather than moving away from the concept of rigour and rejecting the form 
of the PhD in the context of practice based research I would suggest that the 
concept of rigour should be expanded to include seeking out alternative 
perspectives and an ethical engagement with the position of the other. 
Further, I would suggest that the traditional form of the PhD, if it were 
structured around a model of argument as dialogical encounter, holds 
significant potential with regard to supporting a process of enquiry that 
achieves an appropriate balance between situated judgement, deep 
reflection, heuristic thinking, insight and innovation on the one hand, and 
systematic inquiry on the other. 
One final point should be made with regard to the concept of “insight.” Biggs 
and Büchler suggest that insight is a problematic term in the context of 
research because it “connotes a subject-dependent internal sight rather than 
external evidence based assessment” (Biggs and Büchler, 2007, p.68). 
Gadamer’s concept of dialogical encounter offers a very different 
characterisation of “insight.” Considered from a Gadamerian perspective 
insight might be characterised as the recognition or resonance that occurs 
when the perspective out of which the researcher has been operating, 
interacts with that of an other, in such a way that the researcher is made 
aware of a previously implicit aspect of his or her understanding of the 
situation. The awareness may be in the form of a challenge to that 
understanding, an awareness that something is not quite right, that something 
does not quite fit, or it may arrive in the form of a recognition that there are 
parallels between an aspect of the researcher’s perspective and the 
perspective of the other. The alternative perspective may arise out of 
literature search, research data, engagement in practice, engagement with 
research participants, with peers, and with auditors and/or assessors. Further, 
the implicit understanding of which the researcher is made aware, is 
necessarily shaped by shared social practices. All understanding is subject 
dependent (perspectival) but this does not mean that understanding is merely 
internal to a subject. Understanding is socially constructed, our interactions 
with others allow aspects of our socially constructed perspectives to come 
into awareness. Insight should not be placed in opposition to “external 
evidence based assessment.” Insight should instead be characterised as the 
orientation and reorientation that occurs as we come to understand the 
phenomena under investigation. Insight is what guides us in understanding the 
evidence that we should look for. Insight, when operating effectively, allows us 
to recognise relevant evidence when we see it. 
 
Conclusion 
In accordance with Winter, Griffiths & Green (2000, p.31) and Biggs (2007, p.69) 
I hold that the development of practice based research is well served by an 
exploration of exploration of norms of practice operating within traditional 
research areas. The difficulty lies in the fact that these norms are often implicit, 




or minimally articulated, and may vary according to ontological position and 
theoretical perspectives adopted by the researcher or research institution.  
This study reported in this paper proceeds from a commitment to an 
ontological position defined by Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The 
focus has been on concept that is central to the concept of rigour that arises 
from this ontological perspective – dialogical encounter. 
Based on the evidence considered in this paper, qualities associated with one 
or other modes of argument discussed in this paper features prominently in the 
assessment PhDs across a range of traditional research contexts. What is also 
apparent is that the term “argument” was not often explicitly used when 
referring to these qualities. This suggests that the model of argument as 
dialogical encounter, while consistent with qualities that assessors might look 
for in a PhD thesis, is not adequately recognised a potential source of rigour 
within the context of the PhD. It has been my aim in the discussion section of 
this paper to suggest some of the merits of this mode of argument, in the 
context of PhD research generally and practice based research in particular. 
Exploring the concept of rigour from a particular ontological perspective 
appears to be showing up relationships between the qualities that one might 
look for in a PhD thesis that would not otherwise be apparent. Perhaps one of 
the issues that practice based researchers in design should confront is the 
need to clarify the ontological position from which the researcher is working, 
and the concepts of rigour that that position entails. This seems to be an 
important component of research in areas where qualitative research 
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